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I.

INTRODUCTION

Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd.1 presented the
District Court for the Central District of California 2 with an important Alaska state law question regarding the public contracting process. The district court, on a motion for summary judgment, initially
decided that the Alaska Supreme Court would adopt the equitable
remedy of "void contract" when a public contract was awarded and
administered through bribery, but that a defendant charged with bribery could assert the unclean hands defense. 3 The void contract remedy allows a public entity to recover all monies it paid out on a
contract with no set-off for the values of goods or services received.
During oral argument on reconsideration, however, the district court
intimated that it might vacate its earlier ruling and allow trial on the
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Copies of all unpublished sources cited in this article are on file in the offices of
the Alaska Law Review.
1. Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska July 16, 1981)
(No. A81-347).
2. Judge James M. Fitzgerald, federal district court judge in Anchorage, Alaska,
transferred the case sua sponte to Judge William Matthew Byrne, federal district court
judge for the central district of California effective April 1, 1985. Pretrial Order, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Mar. 29, 1985) (No. A81347). Judge Byrne had presided over the criminal case in which Hitachi Cable, Ltd.,
pled guilty to fifty criminal offenses arising out of telephone cable sales to the Municipality of Anchorage.
3. Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment at 4-14, Municipality of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Sept. 1, 1987) (No. A81-347) [hereinafter Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment].

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:227

void contract issue. 4 Such an order was never issued as the case settled prior to the June 6, 1988, trial date, leaving the availability and
extent of the void contract remedy in limbo as a matter of Alaska law.
This article explores several issues raised by the void contract
remedy. Section II discusses the factual background of Municipality
of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. and the arguments asserted by
both parties. Section III presents the rationale behind voiding contracts obtained through fraud, bribery or conflict of interest, and then
discusses how other states have applied the void contract remedy.
Section IV describes arguments against applying the remedy. Section
V discusses the district court's decision to invoke the void contract
remedy in Municipality ofAnchorage v. HitachiCable, Ltd. Section VI
relates the arguments presented on reconsideration of the summary
judgment decision. Finally, Section VII explains why and under what
circumstances the void contract remedy would be appropriate in
Alaska.
II. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE v. HITACHI CABLE, LTD.
A.

Factual Background

The Municipality of Anchorage ("Municipality") and the
Anchorage Telephone Utility ("ATU") filed an action against Hitachi
Cable, Ltd. ("Hitachi") in federal district court in Anchorage on July
16, 1981. 5 The Municipality and ATU sought to recover damages incurred from a bribery scheme that had triggered a federal criminal
6
indictment.
Hitachi was a Japanese corporation that manufactured and sold
industrial cable. 7 During the time period covered by the suit, Hitachi
4. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 14-19, Municipality of Anchorage v.
Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Mar. 25, 1988) (No. A81-347) [hereinafter Mar. 25,
1988 hearing].
5. Complaint for Treble Damages under RICO and Antitrust Laws; General
and Punitive Damages for Violation of State Statutory and Common Law - Jury
Trial Demand, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska July 16,
1981) (No. A81-347).
6. Id. at 12-26. The Municipality's complaint alleged fourteen separate counts:
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)-(d) (West
1984 & Supp. 1989); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ (1)-(2) (1982); Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982); Monopolies and Restraint of Trade Act, ALASKA
STAT. §§ 45.50.562, .564 (1986); Inducement to Breach Fiduciary Duty against all
defendants except McBride; Inducement to Breach Fiduciary Duty against all defendants except Ellis; Breach of Fiduciary Duty against McBride and Ellis; Intentional
Misrepresentation; Negligent Misrepresentation; Misappropriation of Confidential Information; Intentional Interference with Prospective Advantage; Bad Faith Breach of
Contract; Unjust Enrichment and Commercial Bribery; and Void Contract.
7. Opinion and Order at 2, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd.
(D. Alaska Sept. 16, 1982) (No. A81-347) [hereinafter Opinion and Order].
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manufactured telephone cable which it sold to Marubeni Corporation. 8 In turn, Marubeni sold the cable to Marubeni America, a
United States subsidiary. Marubeni America then sold the cable to
the Municipality. 9
In 1978, a federal indictment was brought in the central district
of California against Hitachi, Marubeni America and four individuals, 10 charging an illegal conspiracy, I' violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") 12 and sixty-one
counts of mail fraud, 13 wire fraud 14 and interstate travel to commit
bribery. 15 On September 29, 1980, Hitachi pled guilty to all counts of
the indictment except the conspiracy and RICO charges.16 The penalties for the fifty criminal offenses detailed in the counts totalled
17
$185,000 and 250 years in prison.
The details of the bribery scheme, a scheme which stretched over
six years, illustrate the flaws in the Municipality's public bidding
procedures.
ATU was the municipal department that constructed, maintained
and operated the Anchorage telephone system. 18 Between 1970 and
1978, ATU, after inviting and analyzing competitive bids, awarded
two-year contracts for supplying telephone cable. 19 ATU's bid requests typically covered approximately 125 different types of cable and
required prospective bidders to list their price per 1000 feet of each
20
type.
ATU evaluated the bids by multiplying bid prices by an evaluation quantity, a factor that represented ATU's anticipated need for
each type of cable during the contract period. 2 1 The resulting product
was called the extended price.2 2 The total package price was arrived
at by summing up the extended prices of all cable types, with ATU
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Indictment, United States v. Marubeni America Corp. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1978)
(No. CR78-1060).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1963 (1982).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982).
16. Opinion and Order, supra note 7, at 11.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 1.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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ordinarily awarding
the contract to the bidder offering the lowest
23
package price.

ATU's bid solicitation did not obligate it to purchase a fixed
amount of any particular cable. There were many types of cable covered in the bid that were unlikely to be needed by ATU during the
contract period. 24 ATU requested bids on these "non-buy" items only
to guard against the possibility that some quantities of these items
might be needed at a later date.2 5 Under this system, a bidder with
inside information could generate a low package price yet bid high on
26
those types of cable likely to be ordered.
The Assistant Manager for Outside Plant Engineering and Construction at ATU was responsible for administering bidding procedures, for approving the bids and for supervising contract
performance. 27 The specific responsibilities of the Assistant Manager
included compiling lists of evaluation quantities and non-buy items,
determining which bids met ATU specifications and making final recommendations as to the bid to be accepted.2 8 Between 1968 and 1978,
this position was
held by Richard McBride. 29 His predecessor was
30
Forrest Ellis.
At the conclusion of the criminal plea hearing, Judge William
Matthew Byrne of the District Court for the Central District of California placed on the record the factual basis for the plea. He found
that at a time no later than 1973, Hitachi and Marubeni America had
agreed to pay McBride and Ellis for pre-bid information, that funds
for the bribe were to be contributed by both Hitachi and Marubeni
America and that Hitachi's share of the bribe was to be paid to Marubeni America in the form of a four percent commission. Marubeni
America was to then pass the commission on to McBride and Ellis.
Judge Byrne found that Hitachi knew of the bribe and voluntarily par3
ticipated in the scheme. '
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1-2.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 12, as amended in Pretrial Order No. 3 at 2, Municipality of Anchorage
v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Dec. 16, 1982) (No. A81-347) [hereinafter Pretrial
Order No. 3].
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On September 16, 1982, Judge James M. Fitzgerald of the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment against Hitachi on the issue of Hitachi's liability for acts of commercial bribery, 32 a violation of section 13(c) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 33 The court found that Hitachi was collaterally estopped by its
criminal plea from denying payment of bribes to employees of the Municipality in the form of illicit brokerage commissions. 34 Collateral
estoppel extended to all elements of the individual crimes to which
Hitachi pled guilty and to all factual findings of the trial judge at the
conclusion of the plea. 35 Hitachi, therefore, could not contest that it
had paid bribes to McBride and Ellis in order to secure pre-bid infor36
mation on cable contracts with the Municipality.
After finding liability on summary judgment, Judge Fitzgerald ordered a trial on antitrust damages under the commercial bribery
count.3 7 Both parties hired economic experts and proceeded with the
costly process of assessing the overcharge attributable to the bribery
scheme.
An alternate legal theory existed, however, that promised higher
damages than the potential antitrust treble damage award. The fourteenth claim of the complaint alleged void contract, an untried legal
theory in Alaska, that allowed a plaintiff to receive as damages all
amounts paid out on a public contract tainted by bribery, without setoff for the value of goods received. As void contract was a state law
claim, the Municipality argued it would be entitled, if a prevailing
party, to prejudgment interest, 38 attorney's fees 39 and postjudgment
4o
interest.
The recovery of void contract damages, interest and attorney's
fees would likely exceed the recovery of treble damages and reasonable
32. Opinion and Order, supra note 7, at 15.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
34. Opinion and Order, supra note 7, at 15.
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id.
37. Pretrial Order No. 3, supra note 31, at 2.
38. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010 (1986), as construed in State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d
266 (Alaska 1970).
39. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 provides a schedule for attorney's fees. The percentages applied to contested cases without trial range from 18% on the first $25,000 of
the judgment to 2% on the amount of the judgment over $500,000.
40. ALASKA STAT.'§ 9.30.070 (1988). For the period 1970-78, nearly $9,000,000
was paid for cable. The prejudgment interest from 1970 to the present would be a
multimillion dollar figure, and attorney's fees would be computed on the sum of the
verdict plus prejudgment interest. Postjudgment interest would be assessed at a rate
of 10.5% per annum.
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attorney's fees under the antitrust laws. 4 1 Therefore, the Municipality
requested that Judge Fitzgerald certify the void contract question to
the Alaska Supreme Court. 42 Hitachi vehemently objected to certification, 43 and Judge Fitzgerald decided against certification after a pretrial conference. 44 He allowed the Municipality to move for summary
judgment on any pending issues, including void contract. The Municipality filed a memorandum in support of summary judgment. 45 After
opposition and reply memoranda were filed, the court heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement. 46 Later, Judge Fitzgerald transferred the case sua sponte to Judge William Matthew Byrne,
who had presided over the criminal case in the central district of
47
California.
B.

Void Contract Theories

The Municipality's argument supporting application of the void
contract remedy proceeded in two steps. First, the Municipality argued that contracts tainted by fraud, bribery or conflict of interest
were void at common law. 4 8 Traditionally, in private-party disputes,
such contracts were rescinded, with each party returned
to its pre49
contract condition through the remedy of restitution.
41. For example, in a situation where a municipality was charged 10€ per hundred feet of cable, instead of the proper 8c, resulting in an overcharge of 2¢ per hundred feet of cable, antitrust treble damages would result in a recovery of 6r per
hundred feet. Void contract-based damages, however, would total the full l0 paid to
the supplier. Moreover, the municipality would retain all of the cable. As the size of
the overcharge increases, the advantage of the void contract option diminishes.
42. ALASKA R. App. P. 407 provides the procedural mechanism for certification.
43. Defendant Hitachi Cable's Objections to the Proposed Certification of Plaintiffs' Void Contract Question, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D.
Alaska May 27, 1983) (No. A81-347).
44. Pretrial Order No. 6, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D.
Alaska Jan. 27, 1984) (No. A81-347).
45. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Feb. 22, 1984)
(No. A81-347) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum Supporting Summary Judgment].
46. Oral argument was held May 30, 1984. Minute Order from Chambers, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska May 8, 1984) (No. A81347).
47. See supra note 2.
48. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Supporting Summary Judgment, supra note 45, at
13.
49. Plaintiffs' Reply to Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion
at 10-11, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Apr. 13, 1984)
(No. A81-347) (quoting D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.4, at 618 (1973) ("[o]ne of
the basic remedies for actionable deception is rescission of the transaction that the
deception induced and the restitution of the parties to their pre-contract position.")).
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The second step of the Municipality's argument went beyond the
traditional private-party rescission and restitution remedy. The Municipality argued that when fraud, bribery or conflict of interest
tainted a public contract, the remedy should be full restitution to the
public entity without a quantum meruit set-off for goods received.50
In the context of ATU's cable contracts, this remedy would require
Hitachi to pay back to the Municipality all sums that it had received
under the contracts, while the Municipality would not have to set off
the value of the telephone cable which had long been installed. While
admitting that this remedy was harsh, the Municipality argued that it
have a deterrent
was appropriate under the circumstances and would
51
effect on future illegal public bidding schemes.
Hitachi based its opposition to application of the void contract
remedy on three arguments:5 2 lack of privity, the equitable exception
articulated by New York courts in Gerzof v. Sweeney 53 and the unclean hands defense. First, the theory of the privity argument was that
the actual telephone cable contracts had not been signed by Hitachi,
but rather by ATU and Marubeni America. 54 No privity of contract
existed, therefore,55between ATU and Hitachi, thus precluding the void
contract remedy.
Second, Hitachi argued that the equitable exception articulated in
Gerzof v. Sweeney should apply, allowing a set-off for the value of
goods received.5 6 According to Hitachi, full restitution with no set-off
50. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Supporting Summary Judgment, supra note 45, at
18.
51. Id. at 34.
52. Hitachi argued a number of other defenses not directly attacking the void
contract remedy in its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Summary Judgment, Municipality of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Mar. 29, 1984) (No. A81-347) [hereinafter Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion]. First, Hitachi argued
that the Municipality's settlement with Marubeni America prior to filing the civil suit
constituted a binding election of remedies, foreclosing the Municipality from asserting
the void contract remedy against Hitachi. Id. at 22. Second, Hitachi claimed that the
Municipality, while operating a telephone utility, was engaged in conduct of a proprietary or business nature. The contract, therefore, was not public. Id. at 24. Judge
Byrne rejected both arguments. Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment, supra
note 3, at 9-10.
53. 22 N.Y.2d 297, 239 N.E.2d 521, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1968).
54. Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 52, at
20.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id. at 14-17.
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would result in a forfeiture so disproportionate as to offend the conscience, particularly in light of the fact that the Alaska Supreme Court
57
had never adopted the void contract remedy.
Third, Hitachi argued that the Municipality came to the court
with unclean hands. Hitachi alleged that the Municipality had extorted the bribes from Marubeni America, threatening that Marubeni
America would be summarily disqualified from bidding if such bribes
were not paid.- 8 McBride allegedly stated that the money was needed
to pass along to other key ATU and Municipality officials. 5 9
III.

VOID CONTRACT DOCTRINE

A. Definition and Application of Void Contract
A void contract remedy applied in the public context involves
two steps. The first is the rescission or voiding of the contract. The
second is the application of the remedy so that the public entity receives the full measure of what it paid out, with no quantum meruit
60
set-off for goods or services received.
The voiding or rescission of a contract is rooted in the early tort
action for damages, commonly referred to as an action for deceit. 6 1 As
early as 1201, a writ of deceit existed which lay against a person who
had misused the legal processes for the purpose of swindling someone. 62 This writ was later superseded by an action on the case in the
nature of deceit, which became the general common law remedy for
fraudulent or even non-fraudulent misrepresentation. An action on
the case was later recognized as purely a tort action, not necessarily
63
founded upon a contract.
This common law action for deceit found specialized application
in the public context, particularly in public bidding. At common law
the prevailing view was that "a secret combination or collusive scheme
by bidders for local government contracts, whereby actual competition
among bidders is denied or diminished, is contra to public policy and
void." 64 Another scholar agrees that such contracts are void:
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 8-9.
59. Id. at 9 n.1.
60. S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 298 N.E.2d 105,
108, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 942 (1973).
61. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, KEETON AND PROSSER ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 105, at 727 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER].
62. Id. at 727-28.
63. Id. at 728.
64. IA C. ANTINEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 10.46, at 10-116 (1985)
[hereinafter C. ANTINEAU].
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Any understanding between persons whereby one or more agree not
to bid, and any agreement fixing the prices to be bid so that the

awarding of the contract is thereby controlled or affected, is in vioand renders a conlation of a requirement for competitive bidding
65

tract let under such circumstances invalid.
Case law strongly supports voiding of public contracts that are
tainted by fraud or conflict of interest. For example, in Jered Contracting Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority,66 Jered sued the
Transit Authority for monies due. One of the Transit Authority's defenses was that the contract had been obtained through fraudulent and
collusive bidding. The New York Court of Appeals held that "[a] contract procured through fraudulent and collusive bidding is void as
'
against public policy and recovery cannot be had upon any theory. "67
Courts may also void a public contract when the contract is
tainted by a conflict of interest on the part of public officers:
[I]t has long been the law of California that public officers "must
not be interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members." Contracts in violation of this rule are held void as against public policy,
both upon the ground that the interest of the officer interferes with
the unbiased discharge of his duty to the public, and also that
68 a
contract in violation of an express statutory provision is void.
Several federal cases have similarly declared fraudulent contracts,
and contracts tainted by a conflict of interest, void. United States v.
Mississippi Valley Generating Co.6 9 involved the cancellation of a contract for the construction and operation of an electric power plant.
The vendor sued for sums owing on the contract while the United
States defended on the ground that the contract was unenforceable
because of an illegal conflict of interest on the part of a government
65. 10 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.69, at 386
(3d ed. 1981). See generally Annotation, Conspiracy or Combination to Prevent Actual
Competition in Bids for Public Work as Affecting Contractfor the Work or Recovery
Therefor, 62 A.L.R. 224 (1929).
66. 22 N.Y.2d 187, 239 N.E.2d 197, 292 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1968). The trial court had
refused to apply the void contract remedy, and the appellate division affirmed. Id. at
191, 239 N.E.2d at 199, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The New York Court of Appeals reversed. Id.
67. Id. at 193, 239 N.E.2d at 200, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 103. See also S.T. Grand, Inc.
v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973) (discussed in detail in III.B infra).
68. City of Oakland v. California Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 573, 576, 104 P.2d 30,
31-32 (1940) (citations omitted). See also Morgan v. Gove, 206 Cal. 627, 632, 275 P.
415, 417 (1929) (involving an ingenious scheme of collusive bidding, with rigging of
bid specifications and pay-offs for submission of non-competitive bids and holding that
such contracts contravened public policy and were invalid).

69. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
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consultant. Despite the fact that the federal conflict-of-interest statute 70 did not specifically provide for the invalidation of such contracts,
the court found that the government agent's activities violated the
statute and rendered the contract unenforceable:
As we have indicated, the primary purpose of the statute is to protect the public from corrupting influences that might be brought to
bear upon government agents who are financially interested in the
business transactions which they are conducting on behalf of the
Government. This protection can be fully accorded only if contracts which are tainted by a conflict of interest on the part
7 1 of a
government agent may be disaffirmed by the Government.
K & R Engineering Co. v. United States72 involved certain contracts let by the Army Corps of Engineers. Various parties to the contracts pled guilty to bribery of a public official, conspiracy and
conflicts of interest. 73 On the issue as to whether the United States
could disaffirm the contracts, the court said that "[a]s Mississippi Valley makes clear, it is the potential for injuring the public interest created by a conflict of interest that requires invalidation of the tainted
contract." 74
In summary, scholars and state and federal case law support the
ability of public entities to void contracts tainted by fraud, bribery or
conflict of interest.
B.

Remedy Allowed for Void Contract to a Public Entity

Once a court has voided or disaffirmed a contract, the second step
in the application of the void contract remedy is the selection of an
appropriate sanction. For contracts within the private sector, the
most common equitable remedies for misrepresentation are traditionally: (1) the rescission or reformation of the contract, deed, lease or
other written agreement; or (2) the requirement that the defendant
who has been unjustly enriched as a consequence of performance hold
the money or property he has received subject to a constructive trust
or to an equitable lien intended for the wronged party. 75 As one commentator described it, "The objective of these remedies was to restore
the parties to status quo and therefore to prevent the misrepresenter
70. 18 U.S.C. § 434 (repealed 1962).
71. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 563. See also United States v. Acme Process
Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 147 (1966) (public policy against kickbacks requires that the
United States be able to rid itself of a contract so tainted).
72. 616 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
73. Id. at 472.
74. Id. at 475 (emphasis added). See also United States v. A. and C. Invs., Inc.,
513 F. Supp. 589, 590 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (right of the United States to cancel and annul
fraudulently obtained contracts is well established).
75. W. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 729.
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from gaining a benefit from the transaction. ' 76 Equitable relief, when
granted, is subject to restrictions peculiar to equity. The plaintiff must
"himself do equity by restoring whatever he had received, unless excused by special circumstances; and he must do nothing inconsistent
77
with the relief demanded."
In the public context, on the other hand, authorities support full
restitution to the wronged party, with no set-off in quantum meruit or
quantum valebant. 78 Quasi-contract or quantum meruit recovery will
be "denied to the [contractors] who are participants in collusive bidding on local government contracts, even though the government has
''79
received and retained benefits.
Courts generally refuse to require a quantum meruit recovery in
the following two factual situations. The first situation occurs when a
contractor sues a public entity for monies owing on a contract, and the
public entity defends on the basis of void contract due to bribery, conflict of interest or other wrongdoing. The second situation arises when
the public entity sues the contractor to recover monies alreadypaid on
a contract, again claiming bribery or other wrongdoing. In both situations, the contractor generally claims unjust enrichment, on the theory
that the public entity has received goods or services. The contractor
argues that the public entity should not be allowed to withhold payment (if no payment has been made), or should not be allowed to recover money paid (if payment has already been made). Courts
recognize that there should be no distinction made between these two
situations when deciding the appropriate remedy:
There should, logically, be no difference in ultimate consequence
between the case where a vendor has been paid under an illegal contract and the one in which payment has not yet been made. If, in
the latter case, he is denied payment, he should, in the former, be
required to return the payment unlawfully received - and he
should not be excused from making this refund simply because it is
impossible or intolerably difficult for the municipality
to restore the
illegally purchased goods or services to the vendor.80
76. Id.
77. Id. at 730 (footnotes omitted).
78. Quantum meruit is "[a]n equitable doctrine, based on the concept that no one
who benefits by the labor and materials of another should be unjustly enriched
thereby." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1119 (5th ed. 1979). Quantum valebant was
"[t]he common count in an action of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, founded
on an implied assumpsit, or promise on the part of the defendant, to pay the plaintiff
as much as the goods were reasonably worth." Id. For simplicity, quantum meruit is
used throughout this article.
79. C. ANTINEAU, supra note 64, at 10-117.
80. Gerzof v. Sweeney, 22 N.Y.2d 297, 305, 239 N.E.2d 521, 523-24, 292
N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (1968).
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Cases denying quantum meruit recovery to contractors when the
transactions are tainted with bribery, fraud or collusion are
81
numerous.
Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co. v. United States8 2 involved contracts and leases obtained and consummated by means of
conspiracy, bribery and fraud. The United States brought an action
for cancellation of the leases and contracts, an injunction, the appointment of receivers and an accounting. Pan American claimed certain
credits in the accounting to avoid double payment for royalty oil and
to prevent the United States from being unjustly enriched. 83 The
United States Supreme Court disallowed the credits, however, recognizing that "the general principles of equity are applicable in a suit by
the United States to secure the cancellation of a conveyance or the
rescission of a contract. They will not, however, be applied to frustrate the purpose of its laws or to thwart public policy. ' ' 84 The Court
further noted that "[e]quity does not condition the relief '8here
sought
5
by the United States upon a return of the consideration.
K & R Engineering Co. v. United States86 involved repeated bribery of a contracting officer, who also supervised the work of the briber
corporation. The facts were very similar to the Hitachi scheme. 87 In
1972, K & R became interested in bidding on contracts let by the
Army Corps of Engineers. K & R told Swenson, then Chief of the
81. See, e.g., Annotation, Liability of Municipality on Quasi Contractfor Value of
Property or Work Furnished Without Compliance with Bidding Requirements, 33
A.L.R. 3d 1164, 1185 (1970). See also Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United
States, 273 U.S. 456 (1926); K & R Engineering Co. v. United States, 616 F.2d 469
(Ct. Cl. 1980); Thomson v. Call, 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139
(1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.1057 (1986); Miller v. City of Martinez, 28 Cal. App. 2d
364, 82 P.2d 519 (1938); Shasta County v. Moody, 90 Cal. App. 519, 265 P. 1032
(1928); McNay v. Town of Lowell, 41 Ind. App. 627, 84 N.E. 778 (1908); Kunkle
Water & Elec., Inc. v. City of Prescott, 347 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 1984); Kansas City v.
Halvorson, 352 Mo. 280, 177 S.W.2d 495 (1944); S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New
York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973); Jered Contracting
Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 22 N.Y.2d 187, 239 N.E.2d 197, 292 N.Y.S.2d
98 (1968); Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson County, 243 N.C. 252, 90 S.E.2d 496
(1955).
82. 273 U.S. 456, 486 (1926).
83. Id. at 505.
84. Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 510.
86. 616 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
87. In each case, the underlying wrong was bribery of the public officer who both
awarded and administered the contracts. The bribery occurred over a period of time
through successive contracts. The bribe itself was a percentage based upon the contract value. Finally, the briber purchased inside information that assured success in a
public bidding.
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Plant Branch of the St. Louis District of the Corps with principal administrative authority over contracts, that he would be rewarded if K
& R received some of the contract work. 88 From 1973 to 1975, K & R
was awarded three contracts, with Swenson's aid. 89 The initial agreement provided a five percent cut to Swenson of the face value of any
contract he helped K & R procure. Later the arrangement was altered
to give him twenty-five percent of the profits under the contracts. 90 In
exchange, Swenson gave K & R advance notice of the bid invitation so
that it could prepare its bid. He informed K & R of the maximum the
Corps would pay, thus enabling K & R to bid below that figure. Finally, in drafting the specifications, he set a short time for performance, which would have ordinarily necessitated overtime costs. He
told K & R, however, that the deadline could be safely violated, allowing K & R to submit a bid lower than other bidders by not including overtime costs. 9 1
The United States terminated the final contract when K & R was
unable to complete the job satisfactorily. K & R sued for damages,
and the United States counterclaimed for monies already paid. K & R
argued that since the work that it had completed under the contract
had benefitted the government, K & R was entitled to recover the
monies owed for the completed work. The court rejected K & R's
argument, holding that "whatever may be the appropriateness of allowing such recovery where the government has received benefits
under the tainted contract, recovery is not permissible where, as here,
the firm seeking recovery itself was involved in the corruption of the
government official."'92 Furthermore, on the government's counterclaim, the court held that "to deny the government recovery of
amounts paid under such tainted contracts would reward those contractors who can conceal their corruption until they have been
paid."' 93 The K & R court decided that these principles applied
whether or not there had been any pecuniary loss at all to the
government:
Moreover, the [set-off] argument is inconsistent with the basic principles applied in Mississippi Valley that once corruption is proven,
all financial considerations, such as damage to one party or benefit
to the other, are irrelevant to the government's right to disavow the
contract. The same principle also requires refund of amounts paid
88. 616 F.2d at 470.
89. Swenson was the actual contracting officer for only the last two of the three
contracts in question.
90. 616 F.2d at 470.
91. Id. at 471.
92. Id. at 475.
93. Id. at 476.
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under the tainted contracts, and the question whether the government suffered
pecuniary loss from the contracts similarly is
94
irrelevant.

New York applies the same principles to tainted contracts. In
Jered Contracting Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority,95 the
court declared:
[W]e have consistently held, primarily on public policy grounds,
that, where the city fathers have deviated from the statutory mode
for the expenditure of funds and letting of contracts, the party with
whom the contract was made could not recover in quantum meruit
or quantum valebant. The result should not differ where the due
administration of the bidding statute is interfered with and competitive bidding thwarted by the unlawful collusion of the
bidders them96
selves, resulting in a gross fraud upon the public.

The Jered court refused to allow a quantum meruit recovery despite a
statute which expressly provided that monies owed by a public authority for goods delivered or work done prior to cancellation or termina97
tion of a contract "shall be paid."
Another New York case explained the policy behind the void
contract remedy as deterrence against bidding statute violations. S.T.
Grand, Inc. v. City of New York 98 involved bribery of the Commissioner of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity in return for his award of
a reservoir cleaning contract. S.T. Grand and its president were convicted in federal court of conspiracy to use interstate facilities with
intent to violate the New York State bribery laws. S.T. Grand sued
for the unpaid balance on the contract, and the city counterclaimed
for monies paid.99 The S. T. Grand court applied the general rule of
complete forfeiture of contract sums, noting that application of the
law to particular cases does not vary with the sums involved and stating that "[i]f we would decree a complete forfeiture of an $8,000 contract, then justice demands that there be a complete forfeiture of an
$800,000 contract."' 1
California has recently reiterated its historic adherence to the
principle that contracts tainted by conflict of interest are void, and has
awarded a public entity full restitution with no set-off for the value of
goods received. Thomson v. Call 10l involved the purchase of hillside
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 477.

22 N.Y.2d 187, 239 N.E.2d 197, 292 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1968).
Id. at 193, 239 N.E.2d at 200, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
Id. at 191, 239 N.E.2d at 199, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (quoting N.Y. PUB.
AUTH. LAW § 2601 (McKinney 1959)).
98. 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973).
99. Id. at 303, 298 N.E.2d at 106, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
100. Id. at 307, 298 N.E.2d at 109, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
101. 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986).
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property by the City of Albany. Hubert Call, an assembly member,
sold property to the city using a corporate conduit as an intermediary.10 2 Mr. Call deeded the property to the corporation, knowing that
10 3
the corporation was acquiring the parcel for conveyance to the city.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determi1°4
nation that the transaction violated the conflict-of-interest statute.
As a remedy for the violation, the court ordered that Call return to the
city the $258,000 he had received plus interest. At the same time, the
court allowed the city to retain the land it had purchased.10 5 The
court stated:
Clearly, no recovery could be had for goods delivered or services
rendered to the city or public agency pursuant to a contract violative of section 1090 or similar conflict-of-interest statutes.
Moreover, the city or agency is entitled to recover any consideration which it has paid, without restoring the benefits received
under the contract.106
The Thomson v. Call decision is particularly significant because
Call was found not to have committed actual or constructive fraud, or
to have conspired to violate section 1090.107 On the contrary, he had
even sought and obtained advice from the city attorney on various
occasions regarding the structuring of the transaction. 108
Thomson v. Call represents a recent example of the void contract
remedy which dates back decades in California case law. In Shasta
County v. Moody, 10 9 a county supervisor provided printing and advertising services to county officials during his term in office. The supervisor argued that he should not have to return his fees to the county
without receiving some compensation for the services he performed.
Quite simply, the court held "there is no merit in this contention. The
contracts being void under the express provisions of the statute, and
also being against public policy, there is no ground for any equitable
considerations, presumptions or estoppels.""10
102. See id. at 646, 699 P.2d at 323, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 146.

103. Id. at 642, 699 P.2d at 320, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
104. Section 1090 of the California Government Code provides in pertinent part:
"Members of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers
or employees shall not be financially interested in any contract made by them in their
official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 1090 (West 1980).
105. 38 Cal. 3d at 646, 699 P.2d at 323, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
106. Id. at 646-47, 699 P.2d at 323-24, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 647, 699 P.2d at 324, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
108. Id.
109. 90 Cal. App. 519, 265 P. 1032 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).

110. Id. at 523, 265 P. at 1034. In 1928, section 920 of the California Political
Code provided in pertinent part: "Members of the Legislature, state, county, city, and
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The void contract doctrine is also applied in Iowa. Kunkle Water
& Electric, Inc. v. City of Prescott111 involved a contract to repair the
city's water system. 11 2 The contract had been let to Kunkle without
competitive bidding and Kunkle sued the city for labor and equipment
furnished to repair the system. The city defended on the grounds of
fraud and of a violation of the state's competitive bidding statute. 1 3
Evidence was introduced which established that on thirty-two prior
occasions, Kunkle had estimated below the $10,000 statutory limitation that triggered competitive bidding requirements, and in each instance the ultimate cost had overrun the $10,000 limit. 1 14 The court
held that contracts which violated the statute were void. 115 In addition, the court held that Iowa law prohibited quantum meruit recovery
in these situations. 116 The court elected not to decide whether quantum meruit might be allowed when there was good faith compliance,
yet a technical violation of bidding laws.' 17
The Supreme Court of Missouri applied the void contract remedy
8 At issue
in Kansas City v. Halvorson.11
was an unlawful conspiracy to
defraud the municipality by the presentation of bills for pretended
services.1 9 Halvorson had conspired with the city manager to present
bills which the city manager would then authorize for payment, despite the lack of a written contract for services. 120 The court affirmed
a judgment for the municipality for $132,403.76, representing all funds
2
illegally paid to the defendant.'1
Similarly, in Indiana, no set-off is required. McNay v. Town of
Lowell 122 involved a conflict of interest in which the town sued for
monies paid. The court held that that in some circumstances, where
township's officers must not be interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members." CAL. POL. CODE
§ 920 (West 1921). This was apparently a predecessor to section 1090 of the California Government Code cited supra note 104.
111. 347 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 1984).
112. Id. at 650.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 653.
115. Id.at 655.
116. Id. at 657.
117. Id.
118. 352 Mo. 280, 177 S.W.2d 495 (1944).
119. Id. at 234-85, 177 S.W.2d at 496.
120. Id., 177 S.W.2d at 496-97.
121. Id. at 287-88, 177 S.W.2d at 498. But see Bride v. City of Slater, 263 S.W.2d
22, 28 (Mo. 1953) (when there are no allegations of fraud, collusion, speculation or
improvidence, the recognized rule applies that a municipality cannot accept the benefits of a void contract, retain them and recover back the consideration paid).
122. 41 Ind. App. 627, 84 N.E. 778 (1908).

VOID CONTRACT REMEDY

1989]

an invalid contract had been entered into by municipal officers, recovery could be allowed on quantum meruit or quantum valebant. However, the court stated further that contracts by municipal officers
which were either prohibited by statute or were against public policy
could not result in creating an implied liability against such
municipalities. 123
Finally, North Carolina also applies the void contract remedy. In
Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson County,124 Lexington sued in
quantum meruit to recover for services rendered under a contract that
was tainted by conflict of interest. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held: "No man ought to be heard in any court of justice who
seeks to reap the benefits of a transaction which is founded on or arises
which is in direct contravention of the
out of criminal misconduct and
125
public policy of the State."'
In summary, there is ample case support for the principle that
wrongdoing, whether in the form of fraud, bribery, conflict of interest
or collusion, is particularly offensive to public policy and should result
in the void contract remedy. The equitable remedy of full monetary
restitution to the public entity, with no set-off for goods received, is
abundantly supported by precedent.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE VOID CONTRACT REMEDY

Gerzof Equitable Exception

The most frequently raised defense against the application of a
void contract remedy, and the primary defense raised by Hitachi, is an
equitable exception first described by the Court of Appeals of New
York in Gerzof v. Sweeney. 126 Gerzof involved a contract to supply an
electric power generator. After a court ordered the Village of Freeport to award the contract to the lowest bidder, the Board of Trustees
instead decided to draw up new specifications for the generator. These
new specifications, prepared with the active assistance of the prior
high bidder, were so slanted that bidding by anyone else was impossible. While the second bidding arrangement was still in litigation, the
Board of Trustees elected to install the generator and pay the contractor with full knowledge of the litigation's possible consequences. The
village sued for full restitution of payments it had made to the generator contractor.' 27 The court held that under the circumstances, full
restitution to the village with no set-off would result in a forfeiture so
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 637-38, 84 N.E. at 782.
243 N.C. 252, 90 S.E.2d 496 (1955).
Id. at 255, 90 S.E.2d at 498.
22 N.Y.2d 297, 239 N.E.2d 521, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1968).
Id. at 303, 239 N.E.2d at 522, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
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disproportionate as to offend the conscience. 128 Rather than full restitution, the court fashioned a remedy under which the village would
receive back $178,836, the difference between the amount it had paid
for the generator and the cost for the generator as first bid, plus instal12 9
lation costs.
Gerzof has been both applied and distinguished in subsequent
New York cases. The dispute in Albert Ella Building Co. v. New York
0 involved
State Urban Development Corp. 13
a tunnel project at the Ni3
agara Falls Convention Center.1 ' The tunnel project was segregated
out of the overall convention center project and awarded to the contractor through the issuance of change orders rather than through
competitive bidding. 132 Choosing to follow the holding of Gerzof, the
court did not require total forfeiture of the purchase price as there was
neither allegation nor proof of fraud, collusion or other wrongdoing on
the part of the main contractor. 133 Furthermore, the main contractor
"believed itself bound by the main Convention Center contract to perform such additional work."' 134 The court fashioned a remedy in
which the main contractor had to refund to the city the difference
between the contract price and the price for which a bidding general
contractor would have agreed to construct the tunnel. 135
On the other hand, New York has distinguished Gerzof in S. T
Grand v. City of New York. 136 S. T Grand involved a contract covering the cleaning of Jerome Park Reservoir let without competitive bidding. S.T. Grand and its president were later convicted in federal
court of conspiracy to use interstate facilities with intent to violate
New York State bribery laws. 137 The court applied the void contract
remedy, finding the Gerzof equitable exception inapplicable. S. T
Grand distinguished Gerzof in three ways: (1) In Gerzof there was a
round of untainted bidding that provided a benchmark for damages
that was not present in S. T. Grand; (2) the illegal scheme in Gerzof
infected only the final stages of the contracting process whereas in S. T.
Grand the illegality went to the origins of the process; and (3) there
128. Id. at 305-06, 239 N.E.2d at 524, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
129. Id. at 307-08, 239 N.E.2d at 525, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 646-47.
130. 54 A.D.2d 337, 388 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1976).
131. Id. at 338, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
132. Id. at 339, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
133. Id. at 345, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
134. Id.
135. Id. See also Babylon Associates v. County of Suffolk, 101 A.D.2d 207, 475
N.Y.S.2d 869 (1984).
136. 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973).
137. Id. at 302, 298 N.E.2d at 106, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
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was no conviction of the contractor or any finding of bribery of munic138
ipal officials in Gerzof
In Thomson v. Call,139 discussed previously in Section III.B, the
California Supreme Court grappled with the same type of equitable
problems raised by the Gerzof exception and discussed by the S. T
Grand court. Because the remedy of complete land forfeiture seemed
harsh, particularly in light of the fact that the councilman "was found
not to have committed fraud, actual or constructive, or to have conspired to violate section 1090," 140 the California Supreme Court discussed possible intermediate solutions. One such solution would have
allowed the councilman to retain the monetary fair market value of
the land.' 4 1 Another would have allowed him to retain the amount he
had originally paid for the land in 1970.142
The supreme court concluded, however, that all of these intermediate solutions should be rejected on several grounds. First, any such
approach would involve property valuation problems. 143 While the
courts could solve these problems, a more serious difficulty arose in
that an intermediate approach would provide only a weak incentive
144
for a public official to avoid such situations in the future:
If they enter into such arrangements and "get caught" in the section
1090 violation, this remedy would leave them as well off as they
were prior to the transaction; if the violation goes unnoticed or unchallenged, they would profit from the deal. Certainly, the deterrent effect of the trial court's solution is greater, effectively
implementing the conflict of interest statutes' strict public policy
goals. 145
In addition, the court rejected the argument that this particular land
sale was more advantageous to the public entity than others may have
been.' 46 The court said that "if the interest of a public officer is
shown, the conflict cannot be sustained by showing that it is fair, just
47
and equitable as to the public entity."'
The distinction the New York courts appear to make is the participation in, or knowledge of, wrongdoing by the party attempting to
138. Id. at 306-07 & n.2, 298 N.E.2d at 109 & n.2, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 943 & n.2.
139. 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986).
140. Id. at 647, 699 P.2d at 324, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
141. Id. at 651, 699 P.2d at 327, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
142. Id. at 652, 699 P.2d at 327, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 649, 699 P.2d at 325, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
147. Id.
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invoke the exception. S. T Grand involved a federal criminal conviction; Albert Ella involved an apparently innocent or ill-informed general contractor. California, on the other hand, does not allow the
equitable exception even for apparently innocent parties such as in
Thomson. The principle rationale for California's approach, at least in
the Thomson conflict of interest context, appears to be the overriding
social policy of deterrence: "[T]he prophylactic function of the statute
is to prevent conflicts of interest from occurring ....-148 The California Supreme Court's insistence on deterrence may be well taken. If
intermediate equitable remedies replace total forfeiture, then those
who are caught can expect to be put in as good a position as they
would have been with no wrongdoing. Such intermediate solutions
favor wrongdoers over the general public good.
Under either the New York application or California's stricter
doctrine, however, the Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd. case was inappropriate for the Gerzof equitable exception for several reasons. First, Hitachi pled guilty to all counts of the indictment
excluding conspiracy and RICO. 4 9 The United States District Court
of Alaska granted the Municipality's motion for summary judgment
against Hitachi on the issue of Hitachi's liability for acts of commercial bribery,15 o a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 5' Like S. T.
Grand, and unlike Gerzof there were explicit federal criminal pleas of
interstate travel to commit bribery, mail fraud and wire fraud, and
federal civil findings of commercial bribery.
Second, because of the machinations of the Hitachi bribery
scheme, it would have been impossible to make an untainted determination of the cost of cable the Municipality would have bought but for
the scheme, unlike Gerzof in which there was an untainted benchmark
for damages. In the Hitachi scheme, two tiers of rigging existed. The
first was a disclosure by McBride of the estimated quantities and of the
"buy" and "non-buy" items. Under this system a bidder could generate a low package price while bidding high on types of cable likely to
be ordered if he was privy to such inside information. 52 The second
tier of rigging occurred after the bid was awarded, at which point McBride would order off the "buy" list. 53 It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to determine now what would have been bought but for
the scheme. Many "non-buy" items might have been adequate and
cheaper than "buy" items.
148. Id. at 653, 699 P.2d at 327, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
149. Opinion and Order, supra note 7, at 11.
150. Id. at 15.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
152. Opinion and Order, supra note 7, at 2.
153. Indictment at 10, United States v. Marubeni America Corp. (C.D. Cal. Mar.
1978) (No. CR78-1060).
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Finally, as in S. T Grand, the illegality in the Hitachi case went to
the origins of the bidding process. Hitachi's scheme tainted both the
initial bidding and the subsequent purchasing. The entire scheme determined the award of, and buying under, three consecutive contracts.154
B.

Lack of Privity

Hitachi's second major defense was that the telephone cable contracts had been signed by ATU and Marubeni America 155 and not by
Hitachi. Therefore, no privity existed between ATU and Hitachi, thus
precluding application of the void contract remedy.
This argument misapprehended the nature of the void contract
remedy which sounds in tort rather than in contract. Historically, the
writ of deceit was a tort action for damages, 156 utilized against a person who had misused legal procedure for the purpose of swindling
another.1 57 Later, an action on the case in the nature of deceit replaced the writ and became the general common law remedy for
fraudulent or non-fraudulent misrepresentation that had resulted in
actual damage.' 58 The action for deceit afforded a remedy for many
wrongs now regarded as breaches of contract, such as false warranties.159 Its use was limited to cases involving "direct transactions between the parties" and160came to be regarded as "inseparable from the
contractual relation."'
In 1789, however, in Pasley v. Freeman,161 the English courts formulated the beginning of the modem law of deceit in holding that the
action was held to lie where the plaintiff had had no dealings with the
defendant, but had been induced by the defendant's misrepresentation
to deal with the third person.' 62 Since this time, deceit has been recognized as purely a tort action and not necessarily founded upon a contract.' 6 3 When a suit is brought in tort, privity is not necessary:
"Fraud, having taken the tort road, requires no such privity, and anyone to whom a lie is intentionally communicated may have a viable
claim against the liar, whether they have contractual relations or
154.
155.
20.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 2.
Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 52, at
W. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 727.
Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789).
W. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 728.
Id.
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not."' 64 A basic remedy for actionable deception is rescission of the
transaction that the deception induced and restitution of the parties to
their pre-contract position. 16 5 Restitution in a private party suit usually requires that each party give back to the other what he received in
the transaction and the equity court may ensure that "each party re166
turns to the other what he received in the transaction."
In the public setting, however, this rescission/restitution tort
remedy does not require that the public entity give back the benefit
which it received. Quasi-contract or quantum meruit recovery "will
be denied to the [contractors] who are participants in collusive bidding
on local government contracts, even though the government has re167
ceived and retained benefits."'
Courts have not been persuaded in situations where defendants
try to escape the consequences of wrongdoing by claiming remoteness.
For example, in Manning Engineering,Inc. v. Hudson County Park
Commission,168 Manning commenced a suit to collect the balance of a
fee allegedly due for engineering services. Manning was involved in
collecting kickbacks for Kenny, 169 who controlled the awarding of
contracts by the park commission. 170 The trial court found that Manning had received the park project in return for his faithful service as a
conduit for illegal kickbacks to Kenny. Although Manning's role in
this illegal scheme may not have been the sole consideration for the
contract, the trial court found it to be a significant element.' 7' Manning argued that his historic arrangement with Kenny was sufficiently
collateral to, or remote from, the contract with the county so that the
corruption and the kickback conduit scheme could not taint the latest
engineering contract. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, was
not persuaded and stated:
The gravity of the evil apprehended here is trafficking in the award
of public contracts, enhanced in this case by the scurrilous nature of
Manning's services to Kenny which brought him this contract. The
"evil" is thus of first-level "gravity."

164. D. DoBs, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.1, at 592 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 138(2) (1937) ("A third person who
has colluded with a fiduciary in committing a breach of duty, and who obtained a
benefit therefrom, is under a duty of restitution to the beneficiary.").
165. D. DOBBS, supra note 164, at 618.
166. Id. at 622.
167. C. ANTINEAU, supra note 64, at 10-117.
168. 74 N.J. 113, 376 A.2d 1194 (1977).
169. Id. at 119, 376 A.2d at 1197.
170. Id. at 119 n.1, 376 A.2d at 1197 n.1.
171. See id. at 125-26, 376 A.2d at 1200.
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* In the circumstances of this nature, the doctrine of collateralness must give way to the public policy of discouraging such illegal activities as those admitted by Manning and found below on
adequate proofs to172have led directly to the award of the instant contract to his firm.'
Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. 173 involved an eminent domain proceeding in which the plaintiffs, the Chicago Park District and
the Public Building Commission, sought to acquire a parcel of land
owned by the defendants. Prior to the institution of the eminent domain proceeding, the property had been rezoned by the Chicago City
Council. This resulted in a five million dollar increase in the value of
the property, which the Public Building Commission was ordered to
pay the defendants as a portion of the settlement for the eminent domain proceeding.' 74 It was later discovered that the rezoning had
been secured by means of bribery and fraud. Various municipal departments had approved the zoning change alledgedly in reliance on
representations made to them by the defendants. Wigoda, a city alderman and member of the planning commission, had voted to approve
the application for a zoning change, allegedly receiving $50,000 for his
actions.' 75 The defendants argued that recovery should be against
Wigoda rather than against them. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, noting that as a fundamental rule of restitution, a third person who has colluded with a fiduciary in committing
76
a breach of duty is under a duty of restitution to the beneficiary.1
As in the cases discussed above, the privity defense was unpersuasive in Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. The Alaska
federal district court had held that Hitachi was collaterally estopped
by its guilty pleas in the criminal case from denying payment of bribes
to employees of the Municipality in the form of illicit brokerage commissions.' 77 Hitachi's involvement in the scheme with Marubeni
172. Id. at 141-42, 376 A.2d at 1208-09.
173. 78 Ill. 2d 555, 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980).
174. Id. at 560, 402 N.E.2d at 184.
175. Id. at 559, 402 N.E.2d at 183.
176. Id. at 565, 402 N.E.2d at 186. See also Continental Management, Inc. v.
United States, 527 F.2d 613, 616 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ("In nearly unbroken succession,
courts have declared that victimized principals may obtain non-statutory remedies
against outsiders who have knowingly participated in or induced an agent's breach of
duty."); Thomson v. Call, 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986) (holding that despite the transaction's complexity,
the conduit's purchase of property from the defendant and its conveyance of that
property to the city, were in performance of a single multi-party agreement); Chicago

Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 107 Ill. App. 3d 222, 224-25, 437 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that plaintiffs properly stated a cause of action for imposition of a
constructive trust where defendants were unjustly enriched through a scheme of bribery and fraud).
177. Opinion and Order, supra note 7, at 15.
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America had been established on summary judgment when the court
determined that Hitachi had violated the Robinson-Patman Act by
committing commercial bribery. 178 That the actual cable contracts
were signed by Marubeni America and ATU, therefore, was beside the
point. Hitachi's involvement had been established conclusively in the
prior criminal case and in the current civil case.
As a practical matter, allowing Hitachi an escape hatch because
of its use of Marubeni America as an intermediary signatory would
have offended a public policy designed to deter collusive bidding on
government contracts. 179 If Hitachi had finessed the void contract
remedy, corporations would be licensed to mastermind bribery
schemes with no fear of the consequences, so long as some intermediary signed the purchasing contract. This corporate shell approach
should not be allowed to thwart equitable remedies. Whether one
briber has signed the contract and the other briber has not is irrelevant. That the briber manufacturer did not receive its proceeds directly, but was paid by the intermediary briber broker, is also
irrelevant.
C.

Unclean Hands

Hitachi's third major defense was that the Municipality had extorted the bribes from Marubeni America, and therefore could not recover on the equitable void contract theory because the Municipality
had unclean hands. 8 0 This third argument persuaded the court to
allow Hitachi the opportunity to prove a broad-based extortion conspiracy, which would estop the Municipality from obtaining the void
contract remedy.' 8 ' The court's rationale is discussed in Section V
below.
V.

JUDGE BYRNE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

On September 1, 1987, Judge Byrne filed his lengthy Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment, addressing all of the issues
pending in the multiple summary judgment motions.' 8 2 The linchpin
178. Id.
179. See Plaintiffs' Reply to Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Summary Judgment
Motion at 12, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Apr. 13,

1984) (No. A81-347).
180. Hitachi Cable's Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 52, at
8-9. As part of its unclean hands argument, Hitachi also argued that the Municipality's failure to provide estimated quantities during the bid preparation phase operated
as a fraud on the prospective bidders and on the citizens of Anchorage. Id. at 27-28.
181. Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 3, at 13-14.
182. The Municipality had moved for summary judgment on its claims under
RICO, void contract, inducement to breach fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment, and requested that the court
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of his decision was Hitachi's guilty plea in the criminal case. Citing
the general rule that collateral estoppel applied equally whether the
18 3
prior conviction was based on a jury verdict or on a guilty plea,
Judge Byrne held:
Here, ATU had no opportunity to join in the earlier criminal action.
Nor did Hitachi lack the incentive or opportunity to litigate the
charges of mail and wire fraud, and aiding and abetting interstate
travel to commit bribery, to which it ultimately pled. The Rule 11
hearing makes clear that the guilty plea was both knowing and voluntary. Therefore, applying the principles of collateral estoppel,
Hitachi is estopped
from denying any material fact necessary to its
84
conviction. 1
The void contract portion of the opinion presented an analysis of
the authorities cited by the parties. Of particular significance to the
court was United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,' 85 because it involved a contract let in violation of a federal conflict-ofinterest statute. The statute in Mississippi Valley did not expressly
provide for a void contract remedy, but the remedy was applied to
further the public policy of deterrence.18 6 Citing to section 29.23.555
of the Alaska Statutes, 8 7 Alaska's conflict-of-interest statute, Judge
rule that punitive damages were available, that attorney's fees would be awarded pursuant to statute on the RICO and Robinson-Patman claims and that prejudgment
interest under section 9.30.070 of the Alaska Statutes and attorney's fees under Rule
82 of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure would be available for the state law claims.
The Municipality also moved for summary judgment on Hitachi's counterclaims.
Hitachi had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Municipality's RICO, void
contract, and unjust enrichment claims. After granting summary judgment to the
Municipality on its void contract claim, Judge Byrne denied summary judgment on
the Municipality's other theories because there remained triable issues of fact, and
denied summary judgment on the punitive damages, attorney's fees and prejudgment
interest as premature. Id. at 24. The court also granted summary judgment to the
Municipality on Hitachi's RICO and antitrust counterclaims as the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 30.
183. Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir.
1980)).
184. Id. at 4.
185. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
186. Id. at 563.
187. During the period when the bribery scheme was in place, section 29.23.555 of
the Alaska Statutes provided as follows:
Conflict of interests. Each home rule and general law municipality shall
adopt a conflict-of-interests ordinance which, other provisions of this chapter notwithstanding, includes the provision that an officer or employee shall
disqualify himself from participating in any official action in which he has a
substantial financial interest. If a home rule or general law municipality fails
to adopt such a conflict-of-interests ordinance within 90 days from September 10, 1972, the conflict-of-interests provision of this section is automatically applicable to and binding upon that municipality.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.23.555 (1972), repealed by § 16, ch. 118 SLA 1972, § 24, ch. 83
SLA 1979, § 88, ch. 74 SLA 1985.
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Byrne held that, based on Hitachi's guilty plea, the telephone cable
contracts were in violation of the statute and consequently void as a
matter of law.'188
Judge Byrne summarily rejected Hitachi's privity argument, stating that the argument "would allow the formality of privity to defeat
the strong public policy purposes behind the conflict-of-interest statute
189
and the void contract doctrine, and finds no support in the cases."'
To support its holding, the court focused particularly on the Califor0 Distilling the lengthy Thomson v. Call
nia case of Thomson v. Call.19
rationale to its essence in rejecting a formalistic privity argument,
Judge Byrne stated, "The inquiry focuses not on formal arrangements,
but on interests - whether a party participated in a corrupt arrangement and benefitted thereby. Any other rule would underestimate the
seriousness of such wrongdoing." 19 1
The court also rejected Hitachi's Gerzof argument. 192 Noting
that Gerzof was contrary to the mainstream void contract cases and
that the subsequent New York case of S. T Grand,Inc. v. City of New
York had distinguished Gerzof the court found that Gerzof conflicted
193
with the purposes behind the void contract doctrine.
This emphasis on public purpose and public protection was the
theme often repeated in Judge Byrne's opinion. It served to simplify
the analytical framework, and to eliminate extraneous arguments.
Once the conflict-of-interest statute had been violated, or, analogously,
a contract had been tainted by price-fixing or bribery, financial considerations, such as damage to one party or benefit to the other, became
irrelevant. 194
Given the equitable nature of the void contract remedy, the court
did allow Hitachi an opportunity at a bench trial to present evidence
which Hitachi believed would establish an unclean hands defense
based on an extortion conspiracy. 195 Under Alaska law, the defense of
unclean hands requires a showing by the defendant that the plaintiff
had perpetrated some wrongdoing, and that the wrongdoing related to
the action being litigated.196 According to Judge Byrne, the extortion
defense met this two-pronged test. He stated, however, that "[w]ere
188. Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 3,at 6.
189. Id.
190. 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986).
191. Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 3, at 7.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing K & R Engineering Co. v. United States, 616 F.2d 469, 477 (Ct. Cl.

1980)).
195. Id. at 12.
196. Id. at I1(citing Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 554 (Alaska 1983)).
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the allegation simply that Hitachi was coerced by certain renegade individuals, this Court would hesitate to recognize a defense of unclean
hands to a void contract claim." 19 7 In order to succeed with this unclean hands defense, Hitachi would have to show that there was a
broad-based conspiracy throughout the Municipality to extort
bribes. 198 The evidence presented by Hitachi during the summary
judgment briefing to demonstrate a conspiracy, or a cover-up of such,
included double hearsay statements, which the court ruled inadmissible; 199 an FBI report relating a 1978 interview with the Mayor of
Anchorage who believed that an internal investigation of McBride and
Ellis might have been settled informally; 200 and a 1978 interview with
an assistant purchasing agent who had heard of a payoff from McBride to Ellis several years before.2 0 1 The court found that there was a
triable issue of fact regarding whether the Municipality came to the
court with unclean hands and should consequently be estopped from
20 2
seeking a remedy.
VI.

ARGUMENTS ON RECONSIDERATION

Both Hitachi and the Municipality then filed motions for reconsideration of portions of Judge Byrne's September 1, 1987, Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment. Hitachi filed for an
interlocutory appeal of the void contract decision, 20 3 and moved for
reconsideration of the judge's holding that Hitachi's counterclaims
were barred by the statute of limitations.2 °4 The Municipality filed a
cross-motion for reconsideration on the issue of whether the unclean
hands defense should be allowed against a municipality. 20 5 The briefing in these memoranda centered upon whether Hitachi had shown
sufficient facts to support summary judgment allowing the unclean
hands defense at trial. On reconsideration, Hitachi did not raise Judge
Byrne's threshold decision that the Alaska Supreme Court would apply the void contract remedy.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.

201. Id.
202. Id. at 14.
203. Motion to Amend Interlocutory Order to Include Statement Certifying Order
for Appeal, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Sept. 11,
1987) (No. A81-347).
204. Motion for Reconsideration of Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment,
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Sept. 18, 1987) (No.
A81-347).
205. Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Hitachi Cable's Motion for Reconsideration and in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Reconsideration, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Oct. 8, 1987) (No. A81-347).
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In December, 1987, however, after the briefing cycle had been
completed, Hitachi filed a supplemental brief in support of its motion
to reconsider.20 6 In that memorandum, Hitachi argued that Alaska
cases did not permit forfeiture as a remedy to an illegal contract absent
a clear statutory mandate which was not present under the instant
facts.20 7 The Alaska Supreme Court, therefore, would not have applied the void contract remedy in the first instance. Apparently, it was
these Alaska cases that persuaded Judge Byrne in March of 1988 to
intimate at oral argument that he would reverse the void contract section of his Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment.
The theory of Hitachi's argument was that two Alaska state court
cases, Gates v. River Construction Co.,20 8 and Sumner Development
Corp. v. Shivers,20 9 as construed by the Ninth Circuit in Food Industries Research and Engineering, Inc. v. State of Alaska,2 10 mandated
that the Alaska Supreme Court not apply a forfeiture remedy under
the Hitachi facts. Gates involved a contract of employment entered
into in Alaska by a Canadian alien in which the trial court held that
the alien was barred by the illegality of the contract from securing the
recovery of sums allegedly due.2 1' The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, stating that "when a statute imposes sanctions but does not
specifically declare a contract to be invalid, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the legislature intended to make unenforceable contracts entered into in violation of the statute. 2 12 The supreme court felt that
the employer, who had knowingly participated in the illegal transaction, should not be permitted to profit at the expense of the alien.
Such a result would be so contrary to general considerations of equity
and fairness that it could only be countenanced when clearly intended
21 3
by the legislature.
The issue in Sumner involved whether Shivers, an unlicensed subcontractor, could foreclose his lien.2 1 4 Section 08.18.151 of the Alaska
Statutes bars an unlicensed contractor from bringing an action for the
collection of compensation for work performed.2 1 5 The Alaska
Supreme Court held that this provision expressly barred an unlicensed
206. Supplemental Brief in Support of Hitachi Cable's Motion to Reconsider This
Court's Sept. 1, 1987 Order, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D.
Alaska Nov. 30, 1987) (No. A81-347) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief].
207. Id. at 2.
208. 515 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1973).
209. 517 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1974).
210. 507 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1974), on remand, 388 F. Supp. 342 (D. Alaska 1975).
211. 515 P.2d at 1021.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 1022.
214. 517 P.2d at 759.
215. ALASKA STAT. § 08.18.151 (1988).
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subcontractor from foreclosing a mechanic's lien. 2 16 As partial owner,
therefore, Sumner Development could assert such a defense even
though, as general contractor, it had known of Shivers's lack of bond
and had suggested that Shivers shelter under the bond and registration18
2
of another contractor. 21 7 Relying on a number of California cases,
the court held, nevertheless, that Shivers, although prohibited from
bringing such an action, was not prohibited from asserting a set-off for
work performed in the action brought against him as "[a]llowance of
such a set-off [would achieve] the equitable result of compensating the
owner only if the damages caused [by breach of a construction contract] were greater than the benefit received. '21 9 The court then listed
the factors to be considered when allowing a quantum meruit set-off:
There may, however, be cases where the contractor acted in a
knowing and willful pattern to evade the licensing statute or to defraud the owner. We modify the California rule so as to disallow
set-off where: the degree of criminality or evil, the comparative innocence or guilt of the parties, the extent of public harm involved,
the moral quality of the conduct of the parties, and the severity of
will result from refusal of set-off clearly
the penalty of forfeiture22that
0
callfor a disallowance.
These considerations, which came to be known as the Sumner
factors, were drawn on by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Food
Industries.22 1 Food Industries involved engineers who were not qualified to perform professional services in Alaska, thus rendering an engineering contract illegal. 222 The court found that the illegality was a
matter of inadvertence and bad timing as one of the engineers had
applied for the requisite certificate less than a month after the contract
was made. 223 Citing the Alaska Supreme Court decisions in Gates and
Sumner, the Ninth Circuit noted that the statute at issue in Food Industries had not contained explicit unenforceability or voidness language, 224 and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
216. 517 P.2d at 761.
217. Id. at 763.
218. Id. at 764-65 (citing Dahl-Beck Elec. Co. v. Rogge, 275 Cal. App. 2d 893, 80
Cal. Rptr. 440 (Ct. App. 1969); Culbertson v. Cizek, 225 Cal. App. 2d 451, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1964); Steinwinter v. Maxwell, 183 Cal. App. 2d 34, 6 Cal. Rptr.
496 (Ct. App. 1960); S & Q Const. Co. v. Palma Ceia Dev. Org., 179 Cal. App. 2d
364, 3 Cal. Rptr. 690 (Ct. App. 1960)).
219. Id. at 766.
220. Id. (quoting 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1534, at 818 (1962)).
221. 507 F.2d at 866-67.
222. Id. at 865.
223. Id. at 865-66.
224. Section 08.48.190 of the Alaska Statutes, which was in effect at the time the
contract was entered into, provides:
A registered professional engineer or architect who is not a resident of the
state or does not have an established place of business in the state but who

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:227

Sumner and Gates.22 5 On remand, the Alaska federal district court
applied the Sumner test. It noted that the Alaska Legislature had provided specific penalties for a violation of the statute, but that "the
Alaska Supreme Court may be reluctant to condone a result that
would result in forfeiture unless such was required by public policy."'226 The court speculated that the Alaska judiciary would resort
to the factors enumerated in Sumner. Viewing those facts most favorably to the engineers, as it was required to do on a motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
pursue restitution or an action for quantum meruit. 22 7
Judge Byrne heard oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment in Hitachi on December 18, 1987.228 During questioning, the court seemed adamant that there were distinctions between
Gates, Sumner and Food Industries on the one hand, and bribery of a
public official on the other. 22 9 At the end of the oral argument, Judge
Byrne indicated that he would rule the following week on all of the
motions,2 30 and set a trial date of June 6, 1988.231
possesses the qualifications required by this chapter shall qualify under this
chapter before he may solicit business for, enter into contracts for, or perform professional services requiring registration or permit.
ALASKA STAT. § 08.48.190, repealed by ch. 179, § 1, SLA (1972).
225. 507 F.2d at 867.
226. 388 F. Supp. 342, 343-44 (D. Alaska 1975).
227. Id. at 344.
228. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi
Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Dec. 18, 1987) (No. A81-347).
229. The Dec. 18, 1987, Transcript contained the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Do you find some difference between an engineering company that has unlicensed engineers involved in a company that bribes public
officials?
MR. KERWIN: Your Honor, I suppose that there is a more serious concern with something like bribery than a technical violation. That is not a
distinction that the Alaska Court cases and Court viewedTHE COURT: They never suggested in any of their language, have they,
that we are going to apply the same rule for what you call a teenical [sic]
violation that we will for out and out bribery?
MR. KERWIN: Your Honor, the Alaska cases that we are presenting to
you do involve various degrees of criminal conduct such as hiring illegal
aliens, which has its own problems when they are trying to cheat those aliens
out of their money.
THE COURT: Do you find that a little different than a company that bribes
a public official?
Id. at 9.
230. Id. at 50.
231. Id. at 57.
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On January 29, 1988, Hitachi submitted a supplemental proffer of
evidence in support of its unclean hands defense. 232 In that memorandum, Hitachi discussed various portions of George Sullivan's deposition taken on January 25, 1988.233
Mr. Sullivan had previously been mayor of Anchorage. Among
other things, Hitachi alleged that ATU had been aware, as early as
1965, that its bidding system was subject to manipulation and corruption. In 1971, the Anchorage Police Department had conducted a
three- or four-month investigation of ATU bidding practices based on
allegations that McBride and Ellis were manipulating bids. Mayor
Sullivan had been aware of the full extent of the 1971 investigation and
had participated in various meetings and conversations concerning it.
The City Manager had also known of the investigation and had participated in an executive session of the Anchorage City Council regarding the allegations. It was believed that the City Attorney had
participated in this session also. Despite these events, the Municipality had never ordered an audit of ATU's day labor bids and cable
supply bids, had never pursued the suspicions and charges, had never
bidding procedures nor had it
reviewed or altered the fatally flawed
234
action.
prophylactic
other
taken any
On March 25, 1988, the court held a hearing on discovery motions and allowed further argument on the pending Motions for Reconsideration. 235 The court queried counsel concerning evidence to be
introduced at trial in the event that the court should rule that the void
contract issue would be analyzed at trial in light of the Sumner factors.236 Counsel agreed that if the void contract issue was still to be
tried, the proof would be similar to the evidence that would be
232. Hitachi Cable's Supplemental Proffer of Evidence in Support of its "Unclean
Hands" Defense to ATU's Void Contract Claim, Municipality of Anchorage v.
Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Jan. 29, 1988) (No. A81-347).
233. Id. at 4-8, Exhibit C.
234. Id. at 4-8.
235. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi
Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska Mar. 25, 1988) (No. A81-347).
236. Id. The March 25, 1988, Transcript contained the following query by Judge
Byrne:
I talked to you briefly the other day with reference to your thoughts as a
matter of proof in the trial that if there was going to be an analysis - and
I'll call them the Sumner factors - if there is going to be an analysis of those
factors in the case, what additional proof, if any, would be required on the
question of whether the contract was void.
Let me try to turn it the other way, that if we had a ruling that the
contract was void but the determination of whether offset is available is to be
tried, is there any more evidence that is going to be presented, any different
evidence that's going to be presented than if we tried both the issues of void
contract and offsets.
id. at 13-14.
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presented on the unclean hands defense. 237 As an apparent result of
the judge's comments intimating that the void contract issue would
have to be tried under the Sumner factors, the parties signed a settlement agreement in which Hitachi paid the Municipality $500,000238
and Judge Byrne dismissed the case on June 30, 1988.239
It is difficult to speculate as to what prompted Judge Byrne to
intimate in the March 25, 1988, hearing that he would allow evidence
at trial on the unclean hands defense and the Sumner factors. Perhaps
it was the additional proffer of evidence regarding the Municipality's
failure to follow through on its earlier investigations. 240 Perhaps the
Gates/Sumner/FoodIndustries cases persuaded Judge Byrne that he
had guessed incorrectly in his earlier Order Regarding Motions for
Summary Judgment as to whether the Alaska Supreme Court would
apply the void contract remedy. Certainly there was ample authority
in the Gates/Sumner/FoodIndustries cases to distinguish them from
the Hitachi situation, as Judge Byrne recognized in the December 18,
1987, hearing. 24 1 Gates had involved violations of immigration and
nationality laws, 242 Sumner had involved contractor licensing statutes24 3 and Food Industrieshad involved violations of contractor registration statutes. 244 None of these violations rose to the level of a
criminal conviction for bribery.
If Judge Byrne meant to signal the parties in the March 25, 1988,
hearing that he would try the case with an unclean hands defense and
that he would allow consideration of the Sumner factors to determine
whether there should be a quantum meruit offset, it is understandable
why the parties settled, as sufficient litigation risk existed given the
245
increasing evidence of the Municipality's laxity.
The settlement and ultimate dismissal of the Hitachi case leaves
the issue of void contract in Alaska in limbo. The last applicable order
was Judge Byrne's Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment.
In that order he granted summary judgment, stating that the contract
was void, but found a triable issue of fact as to whether the Municipality was esto]?ped from seeking the void contract remedy because it
came to court with unclean hands. 246 Later events, particularly the
237. Id. at 19.
238. Anchorage Daily News, July 9, 1988, at A-I, col. 1.
239. Order, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. (D. Alaska June 30,
1988) (No. A81-347).
240. See supra notes 232-34.
241. See supra note 228.
242. 515 P.2d at 1020.
243. 517 P.2d at 759.
244. 507 F.2d at 865.
245. See supra notes 235-37.
246. Order re Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 3, at 14.
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court's consideration of the Gates/Sumner/Food Industries line of
cases, cast doubt on the court's own view of its prior ruling. The issue
remains: What should the void contract rule be in Alaska?

VII.

PROPOSED ALASKA VOID CONTRACT RULE

There are several reasons why application of the void contract
equitable remedy, with no quantum meruit set-off, and no unclean
hands or Sumner-type consideration, is particularly appropriate for
Alaska.
First, the Alaska economy includes a public sector that spends
enormous sums within the state and also engages in considerable foreign trade. Because the amounts in these public contracts are large,
the probability of bribery of public officials is greater than in those
states that already employ the void contract remedy. The consequences of detection in Alaska must be high to offset the temptation to
collude. 247 Voiding the contract, with full restitution and no set-off,
would significantly deter collusive behavior. As one commentator observed, "Not until these infrequently prosecuted co-conspirators [bribers and corrupters of public officials] are forced to restore to the people
their ill-gotten benefits, with all consequential gains, will the ever-pres248
ent pecuniary incentive to bribe and corrupt be eliminated.
Second, the equitable remedy of full restitution without set-off
eliminates the time and expense of a jury trial on the issue of damages,
thereby encouraging public entity plaintiffs to sue civilly. The costly
struggle between opposing economic expert witnesses, presenting complex theories and counter-theories demonstrating pricing margins,
profit increments and computer models, is eliminated by the void contract remedy. Void contract is a mathematically simple remedy of full
monetary restitution of all amounts paid under the subject contracts
with no set-off. This usually would mean that the court could calculate the damage award as part of the summary judgment decision, after reviewing purchasing records or cancelled checks.
Finally, the void contract remedy will eliminate the burdensome
cost of expensive discovery, which necessarily occurs in many cases
when plaintiffs must prepare damage calculations or when defendants
are allowed to go hunting for facts to support an unclean hands or
Sumner defense. Particularly when multinational corporations with
headquarters outside the United States are involved, document discovery and deposition trips present tremendous monetary expenditures
247. See generally Strickland, The Thrust-Upon Defense to Monopoly Prosecution
in Alaska, 9 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 87, 100-02 (1979) (describing the economic
market characteristics that make Alaska particularly vulnerable to collusion).
248. Ashbell, The Third Party Trusteeship: An Equitable Remedy Against Bribers
and Corruptersof Public Officials, 67 ILL. B.J. 160 (1978).
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for a public entity contemplating a civil suit. A mathematically simple
remedy will inure to the benefit of the myriad small towns and municipalities in Alaska that cannot fund the type of litigation normally required to prove complex damages.
The issue remains, however, under what circumstances the
Alaska courts should apply the full void contract remedy, with no
Gerzof-type, quantum meruit set-off. Application in future cases will
necessarily depend on particular facts, but some broad categories can
be outlined. First, in instances where there has been a prior federal or
state criminal conviction for price-fixing, conflict of interest, bribery or
related acts, Alaska courts should apply the remedy without set-off.
Similarly, if liability for civil price-fixing, bid rigging or related wrongs
is established by summary judgment, the trial court should apply the
full equitable remedy.
A second category where the full remedy should apply involves
cases which proceed to trial on a bifurcated schedule, separating the
liability phase of the case from the damages phase. Should the jury
find during the liability phase that the defendants were involved in
price-fixing, conflict of interest, bid rigging, bribery or related acts,
then the court sitting in equity should apply the full void contract
remedy.
At the other extreme are factual situations similar to that in Babylon Associates v. County of Suffolk 249 in which the general contractor
was not involved with, nor had any knowledge of, a subcontractor's
illegal conduct. To allow a public entity to invoke the extraordinary
void contract remedy against a deep-pocket general contractor with no
set-off would be unfair. Barring specific language in the main contract
which expressly provides for liability and the full void contract remedy
against the general contractor, it would be unwise for courts to apply
the full remedy.
Between these two extremes fall cases which have split state
courts. Some states distinguish between contract violations that are
malum prohibitum 250 and those that are malum in se.25 1 If a contract
is malum in se, no quantum meruit recovery is allowed; if a contract is
merely malum prohibitum, then quantum meruit may be permitted.
249. 101 A.D.2d 207, 209-10, 475 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871 (App. Div. 1984).
250. Malum prohibitum means "an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY

865 (5th ed. 1979).

251. Malum in se means "an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of
the transaction, upon principles of nature, moral, and public law." Id.
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Coleman v. City of Bossier City,252 for instance, involved the construction of a water and sewage facility. Some procedural statutory requirements for public contracts exceeding a certain dollar amount
were not met; however, there was no purposeful fraud, conflict of inabsence of bad faith the court
terest or other wrongdoing. Due to the
25 3
allowed a quantum meruit recovery.
Conversely, the California Supreme Court applied the full remedy
in the malum prohibitum conflict of interest setting of Thomson v.
Call,254 despite the fact that Call had sought and obtained advice from
the city attorney. 255 Similarly, the State of New York disallowed a
quantum meruit recovery for technical bidding irregularities in In Re
Marvec-All State, Inc. v. Purcell.2 56 This case involved a sewer system
contract that was let without newspaper advertising. 2 57 The court disagreed that the lack of advertising was a "mere irregularity, ' ' 258 and
259
disallowed a quantum meruit recovery.
Finally, in Washington no recovery by the contractor is allowed if
the contract is malum in se, malum prohibitum or manifestly violative
of public policy. In Re Whatcom County Water DistrictNo. 4 v. Century Holdings, Ltd.260 involved a contract between Century and
Whatcom County which deferred certain assessments on unplatted
26 1
lots but required that Century make right of way improvements.
The court held that such an agreement deferring assessments was void
as it violated constitutional provisions. Century, however, was not allowed to recover the $12,000 it had expended on improvements, 262 as
the court stated that "no recovery is allowed if the contract is malum
'263
in se, malum prohibitum, or manifestly violative of public policy.
Two 1988 Alaska Supreme Court cases take conflicting approaches to this middle category of cases. Native Village of Stevens v.
Alaska Management & Planning264 and McBirney & Associates v.
State265 were decided after completion of the Hitachi briefing, and
252. 291 So. 2d 410 (La. Ct. App.), aff'd, 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974).

253. Id. at 413-14.
254. 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986).
255. Id. at 647, 699 P.2d at 324, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
256. 110 Misc. 2d 67, 441 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd, 87 A.D.2d 593, 450
N.Y.S.2d 411 (1982).
257. 110 Misc. 2d at 68, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
258. Id. at 69-70, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
259. Id. at 70, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
260. 29 Wash. App. 207, 627 P.2d 1010 (Ct. App. 1981).
261. Id. at 209-10, 627 P.2d at 1012.
262. Id. at 211, 627 P.2d at 1013.
263. Id.
264. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).
265. 753 P.2d 1132 (Alaska 1988).
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therefore were not raised to Judge Byrne. Native Village of Stevens
involved a contract dispute between the village and an engineering and
management firm hired to manage an electrification project utilizing
HUD funds.2 66 The village terminated the contract, allegedly on the
grounds that HUD's and the state's administration of the electrification project had been problematic, as had been the village's relationship with the management firm. 267 The management firm claimed the
firing occurred when the village learned it could obtain the same services free from the Tanana Chiefs Conference or from the Federal Public Health Service. 268 The management firm sued and the village
defended on the ground that, inter alia, the contract violated government procurement regulations and was therefore unenforceable. 2 69 In
reaching its decision, the Alaska Supreme Court noted in particular
that the contract had not been competitively negotiated and that there
was evidence that the former village chief was given a job by the management firm on the electrification project, a job that the management
firm's predecessor had refused to give him. 270 The court held that the
contract clearly violated federal procurement procedures, including a
conflict-of-interest provision, 2 71 but that the management firm was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the
72
services the village had received.2
In contrast to the apparent acceptance of this quantum meruit
recovery, the Alaska Supreme Court used McBirney & Associates as an
opportunity to expound on the evils of bidding irregularities. The
facts involved a lease of office space in Fairbanks.2 73 A personal friend
of, and fundraiser for, then-Governor Sheffield obtained a draft request for proposal ("RFP"),2 74 and met with the governor and his
chief of staff, John Shively, in order to have the building location area
reduced so that McBirney would be the only potential bidder who
could meet the RFP requirements. 275 The state thereafter decided to
proceed with sole source procurement rather than competitive bidding.2 76 A grand jury found that the resulting lease was tainted by
favoritism, and the state declared the lease void.277 McBirney sued
seeking a declaratory judgment, specific performance of the contract,
266.
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271.
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273.
274.
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and damages. 278279The trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment.
In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the state, the
Alaska Supreme Court highlighted its view of the competitive bidding
process:
The purposes of competitive bidding are "to prevent fraud, collusion, favoritism, and improvidence in the administration of public
business, as well as to insure that the [state] receives the best work
or supplies at the most reasonable prices practicable .... [P]ublic
bidding is for the benefit of property holders and taxpayers, and not
for the benefit of the bidders ....
[S]uch requirements should be
construed2 80with the primary purpose of best advancing the public
interest."
The court, in holding that the lease was void and that McBirney deserved no damages, noted that "[a] procurement system powerless to
rid itself of an unfair competitive advantage gained through inside in'28 1
formation would soon lose every vestige of competitiveness.
But the state had not yet paid out money under the McBirney
lease. The issue, therefore, of a public entity recovering money it had
paid out on a contract, with no set-off for the value of goods and services received, was not before the court. The judicial attitude expressed
in McBirney, however, seems in stark contrast to the quantum meruit
recovery allowed in Native Village of Stevens. Perhaps the court
viewed the state in McBirney as a purely public agency, deserving of
utmost protection, particularly because of its admonition that the requirement of public bidding "is for the benefit of property holders and
taxpayers, and not for the benefit of the bidders. ' 28 2 Perhaps the court
viewed the Village of Stevens as a private or quasi-private entity, not
deserving of such public protection, despite the fact that the project
monies came from HUD. No matter how the two cases may be distinguished or harmonized, the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to consider
a case squarely addressing the void contract remedy.
Strict application of the void contract remedy without set-off is
recommended for this middle category of cases as the overriding concern should be the integrity of the public bidding system. That the
wrong committed is historically malum in se or wrong because prohibited by modern statute should be irrelevant. As the California
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1135-36 (quoting Gostovich v. City of West Richland, 75 Wash. 2d 583,
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Supreme Court reasoned in Thomson v. Call,28 3 a quantum meruit or
provide only
other intermediate solution short of full forfeiture would
284
a weak incentive for public officials to avoid conflicts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The void contract doctrine provides an equity court with a mathematically simple remedy for public contract cases involving bribery of
a public official. This equitable restitution of all monies paid out
under the contract, with no set-off for goods or services received, involves a simple computation obviating lengthy discovery and a trial on
damages typical of other legal theories such as antitrust.
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. provides an ex-

ample of what can happen as long as the Alaska Supreme Court provides no clear indication of whether it will apply the void contract
remedy to public contracts tainted by bribery, price-fixing or conflict
of interest. The stark reality that the case involved the bribery of a
public official was overshadowed as Hitachi hammered away with its
unclean hands defense.
It is time for Alaska to promulgate the Alaska rule on the void
contract doctrine. Waiting the years that might be necessary for a
case to come before the Alaska Supreme Court is not the solution.
The legislature should act to implement the void contract remedy.
Although admittedly harsh, void contract is appropriate for those who
bribe Alaska public contracting officers.

283. 38 Cal. 3d 633, 699 P.2d 316, 214 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1985).
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